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The history of Turkish modernization has been inextricably linked with the
question of secularism. From the advent of the Turkish Republic in 1923,
Islam was held responsible for the underdevelopment and eventual demise
of the Ottoman Empire. Based on the laı̈cité of the Second French
Republic, the secularization programme of modern Turkey’s founder,
Kemal Atatürk, entailed the full subjugation of Islam to the State, its
eradication from the public sphere and its limitation into a very narrowly
defined private sphere.
The transition of Turkey to multiparty politics in 1946 was linked with a
rising role of Islam in the public sphere. Islam became a crucial element in the
political vocabulary of peripheral political forces which challenged the
supremacy of the secularist, Kemalist bureaucratic elite. While a number of
military coups aimed – among other things – to control religion, Turkish
political Islam showed remarkable resilience and adaptability.
Most recently, the transformation of the Justice and Development Party
(Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) into the strongest proponent of
Turkey’s European Union (EU) integration brought Turkey closer than ever
to EU membership, challenged the monopoly which the Kemalist elite
enjoyed as the representative of Western political values and suggested a
novel liberal version of secularism. Yet Turkey has been embroiled since
2007 in successive political crises which had secularism as their focal point.
This article argues that the transformation of Turkish political Islam has
produced an alternative, liberal version of secularism; yet, it has not resolved
deep social divisions. Building a liberal consensus between religious
conservatives and secularists is imperative for the resolution of deep social
divisions in Turkey. The European Union as a guarantor and initiator of
reform could play a major role in building trust between the secularist and the
religious conservative segments of society.
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In December 2007, Fazıl Say, a famous young Turkish pianist who after a shining
international career decided to move back to Turkey in 2002 was interviewed by a
German newspaper, Süddeutsche Zeitung. His remarks caused a controversy, as
Say, speaking on behalf of the country’s secularist elite touched upon a very sen-
sitive issue: secularism in Turkey. The young artist said that he considered emigrat-
ing from Turkey due to the rise of Islamism in the country. In his own words:
Our dreams are somewhat dead in Turkey. All ministers’ wives wear headscarf. I want
to move somewhere else . . . I am waiting for the dialogue of the counter part for six
years. There are some things that annoy me . . . Turkey’s music lover characteristic
is being destroyed.1
Say’s remarks caused a media sensation in Turkey. One of the most charismatic
young Turkish artists, already acclaimed in Europe, who had returned to the
country in 2004, at the peak of optimism about the country’s European Union
(EU) membership, was announcing his intention to emigrate for political
reasons. His statement prompted various reactions from the ranks of the govern-
ment party, the AKP. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan commented that
‘the artists of this country do not abandon it’. Minister of Culture Ertuğrul
Günay responded that ‘His concerns are not founded. I do not understand his con-
cerns about the future of Turkey, either.’2 However, the bitterest reaction came
from the Vice President of the AKP, Dengir Mir Mehmet Fırat, who said: ‘Mr.
Say is free to do so [emigrate]. I respect that and do not feel much sadness.’3
One of the most interesting responses came from another renowned Turkish
artist. Fashion designer Cemil İpekçi commented on Say’s statement in an inter-
view to the liberal Islamist newspaper Zaman as follows:
I know Fazıl Say; he is a very nice person. But what does this ‘those’ mean? Those he
calls ‘those’ get 70 percent of the vote. How does he make this division? These are the
white Turks, 40,000 people to whom my family also belongs, who think that Turkey
consists of Nişantaşı.4 They do not see a Turkey of 65 million people, because these
are the last outcries of a specific minority and dinosaurs.5
Say’s reaction was however characteristic of a wider trend in Turkish society. The
issue of secularism became increasingly pronounced in 2007, as the political dom-
inance of the post-Islamist AKP raised concerns among Turkey’s secularist elite
regarding the future trajectory of the country. The year 2008 was marked by a
closure case against the AKP filed by the country’s chief prosecutor Abdurrahman
Yalçınkaya. In the case it was claimed that the party had become a ‘centre of anti-
secular activities’ threatening the republican nature of the Turkish state. While the
court decision accepted the argument of the prosecutor, it fell short of closing
the party.6
In fact, secularism has been a key political theme since the early twentieth
century. The demise of the Ottoman Empire and the rise of republican Turkey
were linked with a radical shift from pan-Islamism towards secularization.
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Based on the secularism of the Second French Republic, the secularization
programme of Kemal Atatürk entailed the full subjugation of Islam to the state,
its eradication from the public sphere and its limitation into a very narrowly
defined private space. This came under challenge with the rise of political Islam
and an Islamist elite which challenged the supremacy of senior Kemalist figures,
won political power by democratic means and suggested an alternative version
of secularism, which did not oppose a public role for religion.
The summer 2007 presidential crisis7 was illustrative of the relevance of this
conflict to contemporary political developments. This article aims to explore the
question of secularism in Turkey in light of recent developments in Turkish politics
and society. It attempts to define the term ‘secularism’ and questions the consensus
view that Turkey is indeed a secular state. It also explores different conceptualiz-
ations of secularism which lie at the heart of the contemporary debate in Turkey
and are linked to a significant degree to the impact of globalization on Turkish
society. It then examines the transformation of Turkish political Islam, its limits
and evaluates the new version of secularism which the incumbent AKP govern-
ment advocates. Amidst rising social tension, mutual distrust has aggravated
relations between secularists and conservatives, as both sides have become
caught in a vicious circle of claim and counter-claim regarding their motivations
and goals. This article argues that an external actor with bearing on both factions
such as the EU may indeed be instrumental in alleviating mutual distrust and
helping build toleration for different lifestyles in Turkey.
Is Turkey a secular state?
Republican Turkey is often described as the ‘only Muslim secular state’, a ‘model
for the Islamic world’. Nonetheless, a closer examination of the term ‘secular’
reveals that this description is inaccurate.8 The meaning of the term ‘secular’, col-
loquially understood as ‘non-religious’, is not limited to the separation of religious
and political realms in Turkey. Instead, it involves a neutral stance toward different
religious beliefs, as well as the phenomenon of religion in general. A genuinely
secular state has no preferential links with any religion and neither promotes,
nor obstructs religious belief among its citizens. The republican Turkish state
fulfils neither of these conditions. Opposition to any religious form of expression
within a – widely defined – public sphere shows the traditionally hostile approach
of the Turkish state toward religion. For example, the ban on Islamic religious
orders (tarikat) and religious attire, the headscarf issue and the eradication of
religion from the public sphere are all indicative of a state which has long taken
aggressive measures to put religious institutions under its firm control and promote
a ‘religion-free’, ‘rational’ society. Religion was expected to fade away as a result
of the consequential ‘enlightenment’ and ‘modernization’ of Turkish society and
the associated upward economic and social mobility of its citizens.9 As a result,
the term ‘assertive secularism’ – rather than ‘secularism’ per se – more accurately
describes state–religion relations in republican Turkey.10 Nevertheless, the
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assertively secular character of the Turkish state has often been compromised as a
result of political expediency. This compromise was not in the direction of original
secularism, but rather toward championing a certain form of state religion.
Secular–ideological opposition to religion did not mean lack of state interest in
the instrumental use of religion for political purposes. Sunni Islam, as a cementing
factor of Turkish national identity and a counterweight to the perceived divisive
influence of ethnic minority nationalism and leftist ideas, has been skilfully used
since the founding years of the Republic; this also contradicted with the principle
of secularism.11While Islam was purged from the public sphere in the early repub-
lican period, the state kept a firm control over it by banning the tarikats and estab-
lishing the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı – DİB).12
Active intervention and control was viewed as the only means to secure the con-
tainment of the perceived threat from political Islam to the state’s secular ideals
and goals. This policy shift became institutionalized with the official championing
by the 1980–1983 military regime of what was known as the ‘Turkish-Islamic
Synthesis’ (Türk-İslam Sentezi), the introduction of mandatory religious primary
education and clauses in the 1982 Constitution which strengthened the power of
Sunni Islam.13 The pro-Sunni bias evident in the policies of the Directorate of
Religious Affairs, the mandatory instruction of Sunni Islam in state schools and
the state-funded construction of mosques throughout the country – even in
Alevi14 villages – comprised clear manifestations of a pervasive bias in favour
of Sunni Islam.15 Especially when it came to the Alevi question, the assertively
secular Turkish state suddenly became a Sunni one.16
This mixed legacy of animosity toward religion, state control and bias in favour
of Sunni Islam forms the framework of state–society relations in republican
Turkey. Turkey could, therefore, be characterized as a sui generis assertively
secular state, in which long-term antireligious policies are matched by short-
term instrumental use of Sunni Islam.17 This situation created a serious obstacle
in the process of Turkey’s democratization, facilitated the politicization of Islam,
and created an environment conducive to political conflict.18
The transformation of Turkish political Islam
The ‘soft’ coup of 28 February 1997 and the subsequent fall of the coalition govern-
ment led by the Islamist Necmettin Erbakan crucially affected the course of political
Islam in Turkey. At the domestic level, it became clear that any ideas about regime
change and the introduction of the Islamic lawwere utterly unrealistic. This was due
not only to the reaffirmation of the guardian role of the military in Turkish politics,
but also to the lack of appeal of any Islamization programme to the vast majority of
the people.19 If a party with an Islamist political character could ever manage to
claim a leading role in Turkish politics, this could only happen through its trans-
formation into a conservative centre-right party with Islamic leanings.20
At the European level, the 2001 decision of the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) to uphold the decision of the Turkish Constitutional Court on
Democratization 1197
the closure of the Islam-leaning Welfare Party (Refah Partisi – RP) was a mile-
stone event. On the one hand, Erbakan’s decision to appeal to the ECHR against
the closure of the RP undermined his rhetoric against European institutions and
civilization. The establishment of an Islamic ‘just order’ in Turkey, which had
been the perennial quest of the National View (Milli Görüş) movement,21
implied the moral supremacy of the Islamic civilization over the European.22 By
appealing to the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), Erbakan
tacitly acknowledged that ‘Christian Europe’ was an alternative and acceptable
source of justice. The relativization of the concept of Islamic justice by the very
person who had fought throughout his life for its establishment in Turkey under-
mined any belief in the superiority of Islamic civilization and showed that the Isla-
mist political project in Turkey had reached its limits. The court ruled that, by
closing the RP, the Turkish court did not violate Article 11 of the ECHR. The
court held in July 2001 that
the sanctions imposed on the applicants could reasonably be considered to meet a
pressing social need for the protection of democratic society, since, on the pretext
of giving a different meaning to the principle of secularism, the leaders of the
Refah Partisi had declared their intention to establish a plurality of legal systems
based on differences in religious belief, to institute Islamic law (the Sharia), a
system of law that was in marked contrast to the values embodied in the Convention.
They had also left in doubt their position regarding recourse to force in order to
come to power and, more particularly, to retain power.23
This decision, which was made by the Third Section of the ECHR, was firmly
upheld by the ECHR Grand Chamber in February 2003.24 The ECHR decision
demonstrated that Islamic extremism could not be protected by European liberal
democratic institutions. Support of European political institutions for Turkish
political parties under state persecution was not unconditional. Turkish political
parties had to subscribe to European political values to be then able to claim
European support. Like terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism or even traditional
political Islam could not expect support from European courts.25 The threat
which ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ constituted for democratic principles and
human rights was not underestimated, and the misuse of democratic institutions
for undemocratic objectives could not be endorsed by European institutions
In the aftermath of the RP closure, ideological debate within the Virtue Party
(Fazilet Partisi – FP), the party which succeeded RP as the representative of
Turkish political Islam, showed a radical ongoing transformation. Many of its
members attempted to break the vicious circle of state suppression by advocating
a radical transformation of Islamist ideology. The establishment of an Islamic
republic would no more be the ultimate aim. Allegiance to the secular principles
of Western European democracy was instead adopted, and an amalgamation of
Islamic values with Western political liberalism was attempted.26 The quest for
Islamic religious freedoms was now framed in the language of political liberalism
andmulticulturalism. Crucial for the rehabilitation of the hithertoWestern image of
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‘corruption’ was the experience of immigration to Western Europe for millions
of Turkish citizens, who realized that they could more freely practice Islam in
‘Christian’ Germany than in ‘Muslim’ Turkey. The German legal order lacked
the restrictions in the manifestation of Islamic religious belief in the public
sphere, which hampered Islamic religious freedom in Turkey.27
This ideological trend within the Islamist intelligentsia obtained a political
vehicle with the formation of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalk-
ınma Partisi – AKP) in the aftermath of the closure of the FP in 2001. The AKP
leadership took pains to dissociate the new party from its Islamist past, and adver-
tised itself as a moderate conservative party,28 loyal to secularism.29The new ideol-
ogy of the party was an amalgam of conservativism, liberalism, Islamic values and
rightist political ideas. The term ‘Islamist’ was rejected as a description of the ideo-
logical identity of the party; the term ‘conservative democratic’ (muhafazakâr
demokrat) was preferred.30 The AKP was the first party from the Islamic political
tradition to address the grievances of Turkey’s pious Muslim population not in
terms of Islamic justice or ‘just order’ (âdil düzen), but on the basis of a liberal
and human rights agenda. The assertively secular character of the Turkish state
was criticized, not from an Islamist but from a liberal perspective. Contested
issues of major symbolic importance, like the headscarf and religious education,
were now discussed as evidence of Turkey’s democratic deficit. The liberal shift
of the AKP was confirmed when – contrary to the tradition of the National
View parties – it ardently supported Turkey’s bid for EU membership.
The November 2002 elections became the big test case for the AKP political
experiment: With 34.43% of the vote and 365 parliamentary seats the AKP
formed a single-party government, while the traditionalist Islamic Felicity Party
(Saadet Partisi – SP) gained only 2.49% and no seats. The AKP had succeeded
in winning power, dominating the political agenda and ideology of Turkish
political Islam and opening it to the influence of Western political ideas. The
emphasis on Islamic morality as an antidote to chronic political corruption
remained,31 but the political priorities of the new government were different.
After taking over power, the AKP and its leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan vowed to
pursue the reform steps necessary for Turkey to qualify for the start of EU
accession negotiations. The prospect of EU membership provided a vision, which
the majority of Turkish society shared.32 The AKP leadership realized that the
European Union could be of critical help in its effort to gain political legitimacy33
and promote the sensitive, religion-related aspects of its political agenda. By
becoming an ardent supporter and promoter of Turkey’s EU membership, the
AKP leadership challenged the monopoly of Kemalist elites in their advocacy of
Westernization and EU membership. Raising the level of human rights protection
in Turkey to the European standards fell within the scope of fulfilling the
Copenhagen Criteria for the start of EU accession negotiations, and created the
conditions for their successful completion. The reform of Turkey’s human rights
legislation would necessarily mean a redefinition of the public and private spheres
in Turkish society. Many activities which would – until the reform – fall within
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the scope of the public realm, would now be transferred to the private realm and thus
enjoy full protection under the new human rights legislation.34 The prospect of EU
membership and the EU monitoring of Turkish politics also provided a secure
environment against any intervention by military and bureaucratic elites. This
enabled the AKP government to implement its reformist political programme,
which confirmed the transformation of the AKP from an Islamist to a conservative
democratic party,35 increasingly similar to the equivalent religious value-based
Christian Democratic parties of Western Europe.
A new version of secularism in the making?
While Europe affirmed its opposition to Islamic fundamentalism by refusing to
provide protection to the RP and Turkish political Islam was transformed, the
question of how to protect freedom of religion against state practices remained
open. Turkish political Islam traditionally viewed the secularist character of the
Turkish state as a dire consequence of the Kemalist Westernization project.
Europe was the historic cradle of assertive secularism and as such responsible
for the antireligious character of the Turkish Republic. Nonetheless, with the rise
of the AKP, Islamist intellectuals and politicians, alternative Western systems of
regulating state–religion relations were explored. The fact that the AKP aban-
doned the Islamic state project for the sake ofWestern liberal democratic principles
did not mean that it lost its sensitivity on issues of religious freedom; its argument,
however, was now based upon political liberalism.36 The establishment of a plur-
alist public sphere in Turkey was now suggested as the solution for the problems
related to the public visibility of Islamic identity in Turkey.37 This could be the
starting point for the reform of Turkish secularism. This was inspired by French
la¿cité of the Second French Republic, the most antireligious system in the
Western world and hardly compatible with the principles of Western European
liberal democracy. It was, therefore, possible to argue for a reform of Turkish asser-
tive secularism not on the basis of restoring Islamic law, but rather of introducing
liberal principles.38 This reform would aim at substituting a truly secular, religion-
blind policy for the antireligious character of state policies as well as the bias in
favour of Sunni Islam. This model of ‘passive secularism’ would be distanced
from the French model of la¿cité and could be more closely related to the United
Kingdom or German models of secularism and Western European liberal stan-
dards.39 It would protect state and religion from mutual interventions and protect
Turkish democracy without obstructing the free religious expression of the
majority of the Turkish people. In a treatise, which appeared on the official AKP
website and could thus be considered to reflect the party’s official views,
Akdoğan, a scholar affiliated with the AKP, argued:
The AKP understands ‘secularism’40 as an institutional stance and method, which
ensures that the state remains neutral and keeps an equal distance from all religions
and ideas; differences of religion and/or different confessions and ideologies can
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be professed in social peace without them turning into conflict. The party thinks that,
for secularism to work as an adjudicating institution (hakem muessesi) of the funda-
mental rights and freedoms under constitutional protection, it needs to be supported
by democracy and operate in a conciliatory environment.41
Thus, the AKP accepted secularism as ‘an indispensable condition of democracy
and the guarantee of the freedom of religion and conscience’,42 while simul-
taneously linking it with democracy and human rights. This position attempted
to reconcile the legacy of illiberal Turkish assertive secularism with respect for
democratic principles and fundamental freedoms. Secularism should not mean
the absence of religion from the public sphere, or the state control of religious
institutions. The version of passive secularism that the AKP advocated did not
eliminate religion from the public sphere, but required the state to adopt a
neutral stance on religious issues and respect the freedoms of religion and con-
science of its citizens.43 The re-emergence of religion in the public sphere
should not, therefore, be seen as a reassertion of militant political Islam, but as
maturation in the process of democratization and transition from assertive to
passive secularism. The introduction of such a secular system would mean the
simultaneous abolition of Kemalist assertive secularism and Islamism in favour
of a liberal democratic solution.44 This became clear in the AKP political pro-
gramme in 2004, where secularism was defined as an ‘orienting principle for the
state, but not for the individual’, ‘a means to freedom and social harmony’ and
‘a guarantee of freedom of conscience’.45
The appeal of this redefinition of secularism was not restricted to the leading
circles of the AKP. Prominent Islamist intellectuals, who had once supported
the establishment of an Islamic state in Turkey, became proponents of Turkey’s
European vocation.46 The European Union was no more the arch enemy, but a
de facto ally in their struggle against the Kemalist secularism and its iron fist,
the military. The reform of assertive secularism could be achieved through
Turkey’s democratization, which only the process of Turkey’s EU accession
could guarantee. While democracy and human rights had been despised as
prime examples ofWestern concepts, which had adulterated sound Islamic political
thought, they now occupied the centre of Islamist political discourse,47 offering a
solution for the problem of secularism. The adoption of these principles of
modernity resulted in a paradoxical situation whereby former Islamist intellectuals
were defending human rights and democracy, pointing to the shortcomings of the
Kemalist modernization project, which, despite professing modernity, had failed
to deliver its proclaimed biggest blessings.48
The headscarf issue
The same liberal discourse was recently applied in a novel approach to the head-
scarf issue, one of the symbols of the secularist controversy in republican
Turkey (also see Barras’ article in this special issue). The ban on females’ headscarf
use in state institutions was one of the clearest manifestations of the assertively
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secular character of republican Turkey. The rise of an Islamic ‘counter-elite’ in the
1980s had resulted in the extreme politicization of the headscarf issue as the
members of the new elite felt able to challenge the hegemony of the established
secular elite. While retaining its original religious and traditional meaning,
wearing the headscarf also achieved an explicitly political symbolic value. It
became a political statement of a new rising and ambitious elite. Nonetheless,
the argument in favour of females’ headscarf use was still based on an Islamist
discourse. The headscarf was understood as an indispensable element of female
Islamic morality, and Islamic law failed to recognize the distinction between the
public and the private sphere. The assertively secular principle of keeping religion
outside the public sphere could not tolerate the most public manifestation of
resistance to assertive secularism. The purge of the public sphere culminated in
the aftermath of the ‘soft’ coup of 28 February 1997. The response to this campaign
by the short-lived FP and, most importantly, the AKP, markedly differed in its
content. Under the AKP, reference was made to the idea of ‘universal human
rights’ embodied in international human rights conventions, and Islamic law was
no more seen as the sole manifestation of justice. The right to education, the prin-
ciple of non-discrimination, the freedom of religion as protected by the ECHR and
other international human rights treaties were quoted in defence of the right of
women to wear the headscarf. Even the solution suggested for the problem,
based on a ‘social consensus’,49 was borrowed from Western liberal thought.50
This shift in the AKP discourse was not well received by everyone. Many
secularists saw the headscarf question as a litmus test for the commitment of the
AKP to republican ideals. Another segment of the republican elites persistently
doubted the motives of the AKP government, accusing it of having a secret
agenda for the Islamization of Turkish state and society.51 They argued that the
AKP leadership could not have jettisoned its Islamist worldview within a few
years. It was argued that it had actually been engaged in dissimulation (takiyye)
by hiding its true intentions to establish an Islamic state, until the time was
ripe.52 Although such arguments were rather exaggerated, they were sometimes
supported by clumsy attempts by the AKP to appease the Islamist part of its
electoral base.53
The rise of the AKP to power in November 2002 did not signal a break with
past state policies on the headscarf issue. Despite the explicit expectations of its
electoral base, the AKP government normally abstained from openly raising the
headscarf issue, in an effort to avoid polarizing the political scene and antagonizing
the military and bureaucratic elites. Instead it opted to wait for the imminent
decision of the ECHR on the issue, which was hoped to relieve the government
of the political cost of reforming the headscarf legislation. The decision of the
ECHR, however, in the case of Leyla Şahin vs. Turkey did not help these plans.
As Barras shows in her contribution to this special issue, the court ruled that
there was no violation of Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience and religion)
of the ECHR when the applicant was denied access to university examination
and enrolment, because she wore a headscarf.54 Although the ECHR decision
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did not help resolve the headscarf issue in Turkey, it had no profound impact on the
liberal basis of the AKP public discourse.55 However, it may have been one of the
reasons for weakening its zeal to pursue EU-driven reform, which suffered a severe
deceleration after 2004.
The symbolic significance of the headscarf issue was confirmed once again,
when it became the focus of the confrontation between the AKP government
and the bureaucracy in 2007. The constitutional amendment annulled by the Con-
stitutional Court was meant to resolve a problem which has grown far beyond its
original dimensions and has underlined the inability of Turkey’s society to reach a
liberal consensus to accommodate its diversity.
The Directorate of Religious Affairs
The AKP showed less determination in applying the same liberal discourse in the
case of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı – DİB). The
exponential growth of the activity of the Directorate since the 1980s has been one
of the clearest indicators of the Islamist social and political resurgence. Its budget in
2007 was 38% bigger than the budget of the Ministry of Interior, 2.3 times that of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and twice that of the Ministry of Culture.56 Its per-
sonnel grew from 25,236 in 1970 to over 74,114 in 2004, while the number of
mosques nearly doubled, from 42,744 in 1971 to 76,445 in 2004.57 The expanding
activity of the Directorate undermined the secular character of the Turkish state,
given that it exclusively promoted Sunni Islam. Alevi associations and other reli-
gious minority representatives have repeatedly addressed their grievances about
the Sunni bias of the Directorate and the absence of any funding programmes
for Alevi religious houses of worship (cemevi). The reform of the Directorate
was suggested by human rights organizations as a necessary step for the establish-
ment of genuine secularism. Two possible solutions were suggested. The state
should either cede control of the Directorate to the religious communities them-
selves, or maintain control of the Directorate, but guarantee the proportional
representation of all religious groups in it, as well as their proportionate access
to the Directory budgetary funds.58 The prospect of Turkey’s EU membership
brought the Directorate to public attention, as EU Commission reports noted its
unequal treatment of religious groups.59During the ensuing discussions on necess-
ary reform steps, some human rights organizations suggested the transformation
of the Directorate into an autonomous state authority, following the example of
the Higher Education Council (Yüksek Öğretim Kurulu – YÖK). Other experts
suggested the abolition of the Directorate and the takeover of its activities by
the religious communities. Securing equal access of non-Sunni Muslims to the
Directorate and its services was also underlined.60 While the implementation
of these proposals could contribute to the elimination of the Sunni bias of the
Directorate, the AKP government did not display the same energy that it had
shown in advocating the free profession of the Islamic faith in public space.
Occasional statements by AKP officials – including Prime Minister Erdoğan
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himself – on Alevi grievances regarding the Directorate did not convey the
expected level of sensitivity and loyalty to liberal principles when it came to recog-
nizing Alevis as a separate religious group and not just as a branch of Sunni
Islam.61 It seems that the Sunni background of the AKP leadership has obstructed
a liberal approach to the Directorate question, casting doubt about the depth of its
liberal convictions.62 Nonetheless, the existence of a persistent debate on how to
bring the Directorate’s role and functions in line with liberal and secular ideas
does provide evidence that, although the AKP has failed in this case to play the
role of a reform catalyst, the introduction of a new secularism has become a key
issue in the country’s political agenda.63
Secularism as the focal point of a major political crisis
2007 was a tumultuous year in Turkish politics. Both presidential and parliamen-
tary elections took place in the summer of that year in a very tense political atmos-
phere in which secularism was the key political issue. A crisis erupted on 24 April
2007, when Prime Minister Erdoğan announced his decision to support the candi-
dacy of Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül for the office of the Republic’s President.
Secularist media and civil society objected to the candidacy on the grounds that it
prepared the abolition of secularism and the very principles of the Republic. The
fact that Gül’s wife Hayrünissa wore a headscarf and statements Gül had allegedly
made in the 1990s as a member of the Islamist Welfare Party (Refah Partisi-RP)
sufficed to declare his candidacy a threat for the Republic.
Civil society associations were soon also involved. On 14 April 2007, secular-
ist associations organized a demonstration in Ankara to declare their determination
to defend secularism and the spirit of the Republic. The demonstration, symboli-
cally organized in front of Anıtkabir, Atatürk’s mausoleum, gathered big crowds
and was followed by similar demonstrations in Istanbul on 28 April 2007, and
Izmir and other smaller cities on 14 May 2007. Large turnouts manifested the
divide within Turkish society. The millions of Turkish citizens who demonstrated
in Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir and other cities in defence of the secular values of the
Republic represented the middle-class elites of the country who felt threatened by
the meteoric rise of the AKP, the further reinforcement of the party-affiliated
conservative elite and its prospective control of both highest state offices. Despite
repeated statements by the AKP about its commitment to the secular principles of
the Republic and its comprehensive reform programme, they insisted that the
government party was performing takiyye – and that there was a hidden agenda
to Islamize the country. The unease of a large part of Turkey’s middle class about
the rise of the AKP was matched with severe bureaucratic and military reaction.
The political turmoil took the dimensions of a constitutional crisis when the
military and civil bureaucracy took a clear position against the government. On
27 May 2007, the General Staff issued a statement which appeared on its
website. In an intervention for which the neologism ‘e-coup’ was coined, the
military listed a number of incidents which adopted the claims that a rising Islamist
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activity comprised a serious threat for the Turkish Republic and warned that the
Turkish military would not remain indifferent to such a development.
During the last days, the problem which emerged in the Presidential election process
has been focused on the debate of secularism. The Turkish Armed Forces follow this
with concern. One should not forget that the Turkish Armed Forces are a party in
these discussions and a definitive defender of secularism. The Turkish Armed
Forces are definitively against the discussions and unfounded allegations made
and, if necessary, will expose their stance and behaviour in an open and clear
way . . . The Turkish Armed Forces maintain their unshakeable decisiveness
regarding the flawless implementation of their law-given duties to protect these
features and maintains a firm belief in the binding character of this decisiveness.64
This direct political intervention of the military caused a major political crisis in
a country with a long record of military coups. What made the situation worse
was that the major opposition party, the secularist Republican People’s Party
(Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – CHP) did not object to the military intervention into
politics and its threats against the government but, on the contrary, seemed to
endorse them. The situation was further aggravated on 1 May 2007. On that day,
the Constitutional Court delivered a controversial opinion on the question of a
quorum in the presidential elections, following an appeal by the CHP. The decision
upheld the CHP’s claim and made the election of an AKP-supported presidential
candidate by the parliament impossible. While the legal basis of the decision
was at best unsound, at the political level, this decision showed that the judiciary
had in effect sided with the military in its opposition to the government party. The
court decision stalled the presidential election process and led Prime Minister
Erdoğan to call for early elections on 22 July 2007, as well as a constitutional
referendum to establish the popular election of the president.
A tense election campaign came to an end with a triumphant victory for the
incumbent AKP. With 46.7% of the vote, the government party scored a victory
whose magnitude had been difficult to predict. Despite being in power for
almost five years, the AKP increased its electoral appeal by more than 12% com-
pared to the 2002 elections. This was the strongest proof that the party enjoyed the
broad support of the public in its confrontation with the military and bureaucratic
elites. By its vote, the Turkish people condemned the bureaucratic interventions
and infringement of democratic practices. In fact, the sharp rise of the AKP’s
electoral strength could only be explained in terms of result of the political
crisis. The polarizing effect of the military encroachment made many Turkish
democratic citizens vote for the AKP, not because they approved of their political
programme, but simply in order to protest against the military involvement.
Yet, more turmoil was to follow when the AKP government allied with the
opposition Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi – MHP) to pass
a constitutional amendment whose aim was to allow the use of the headscarf in
university campuses. The CHP appealed against the amendment which was
passed with a large majority in the Constitutional Court. The decision of the
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Constitutional Court to annul the amendment appeared to set an alarming precedent,
reinforcing claims by intellectuals about the rise of a ‘juristocracy’, a regime where
the sovereignty does not belong to the people or the parliament but to the judiciary.
Meanwhile, in March 2008, the Chief Prosecutor Abdurrahman Yalçınkaya filed
a closure case against the AKP accusing it of having become a ‘centre of anti-
secular activity’.65 The court’s decision in July 2008 adopted the argument of the
prosecutor but fell short of closing the government party. Instead, it set its future
political initiatives on secularism under judicial scrutiny.66
Secularism and the fear of Turkey’s Islamization
The backdrop to the political crisis was an increasing apprehension in Turkey’s
secular class about an encroaching Islamization threat. Justified or not, this fear
did have a significant impact on the attitudes of a sizeable part of the Turkish
people. The electoral victory of the AKP in the 2002 elections marked a milestone
in the rise of a new Islamist ‘counter-elite’. A new generation of well-educated,
Western-oriented, religious and conservative professionals, who first appeared in
the 1980s, was taking control of the country’s government for the first time.
During AKP rule, they further strengthened their position within the state admin-
istration, despite the opposition of the Republic’s secularist President Ahmet
Necdet Sezer and the opposition of the country’s military and state bureaucracy.
The election of Abdullah Gül to the President’s office meant the takeover by the
AKP of the last secularist bastion in executive power. For the first time since the
1950s, peripheral social forces which were hitherto marginalized in republican
Turkish politics would assume control of the state.67 This upset the secularist
elites who had seen their political and social influence waning alarmingly in
recent years. Their major participation in the ‘republic’s demonstrations’, a
series of secularist, anti-AKP demonstrations organized throughout Turkey in
spring 2007, manifested their unease at the new constellation of powers in the
Turkish political system. It also underlined their fear about the sustainability of a
secular way of living in an AKP-dominated Turkey. Despite being a numerical
minority in Turkish society, they enjoyed a disproportionate influence upon
Turkish politics. However, as a consequence of Turkey’s democratization, their
position became untenable. As Turkey was transforming into a democratic
society, political power gradually shifted from the secularist elite to the conserva-
tive social majority, which was very successfully represented by the AKP. Fazıl
Say’s reaction, underlined at the beginning of this study, also mirrored the inability
of many Turkish secularists to adapt to this new environment. Cemil İpekçi’s
response pointed directly to that.
Confusion about the ongoing Islamization of Turkish society did not leave aca-
demia unscathed. Conflicting information and opinion polls allowed academics to
defend antithetical positions on the issue of the Islamization of Turkish society.
Two major surveys published in late 2007 announced conflicting results on the
headscarf issue, which had the effect of increasing still further public attention.
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The first survey argued that despite what many secularist Turks thought, the
number of covered women as a percentage of the whole population had fallen.68
It was only their rising public visibility and the fact that they were freer now to
commute and participate in public life that jointly created the impression that the
use of the headscarf was increasing in Turkey.69 However, according to the
second survey, there was a slight rise in the number of covered women as a percen-
tage of the whole population. More significant though was the sharp rise of the per-
centage of women wearing the politically significant türban70 among the covered
women.71 Fears about Turkey apparently impending Islamization were often
linked to the transformation of the Turkish political Islam. Many secularists
argued that Turkey was distancing itself from Europe and increasingly resembling
Malaysia as an economically globalized but socially Islamic society.72 In addition,
many scholars pointed to the lack of a liberal consensus in Turkey as the root of
more general social mistrust and conflict. In what Şerif Mardin called the ‘neigh-
bourhood’s pressure’ (mahalle baskısı),73 Turkey’s rising peripheral, conservative
social class was attempting to impose its communitarian social values upon the
secularist segment of the society. However, the core element of this stance, i.e.
lack of respect for individual autonomy, did not pertain only to conservatives; it
pervaded the whole of Turkish society. Thus the resolution of Turkey’s deep
social division on the issue of secularism remains inextricably linked with the
rise of a liberal consensus which would allow the coexistence of different lifestyles.
To this end, Turkey’s EU membership could be of critical significance in terms of
anchoring reform already made and triggering further liberalization.
Conclusion
Secularism has remained a focal point of Turkish politics throughout the history of
republican Turkey. While Islamist political parties used to challenge secularism on
Sharia-based arguments, the transformation of political Islam allowed for a liberal
critique of Turkish secularism. The AKP advocated a version of secularism which
would not ostracize manifestations of religious belief from the public sphere.
Nonetheless, secularism remained a deeply divisive issue and led to consecutive
political crises. Following his controversial election, President Abdullah Gül
tried to convince everyone of the AKP government’s commitment to the secular
principles of the Republic. In his inauguration speech, he once more dismissed
claims about the existence of a hidden Islamist agenda and added:
The Turkish Republic is a democratic, secular, social state, governed by the rule of
law. These features established through the non-amendable stipulations of our consti-
tution are a whole and each of them is undoubtedly a fundamental value of our
Republic. I will always be determined and resolved to advocate, without discrimi-
nation, each of these principles and to further strengthen them at every opportunity.
Secularism, one of our foundational principles is a rule of social peace, as well as a
model which allows for different ways of life within democracy, a system based on
law and freedoms.74
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Many expected that both President Gül and Prime Minister Erdoğan would give
clear political signals of their intentions to respect religious freedom and advocate
a tolerant version of secularism. Yet the country again became embroiled in a bitter
confrontation between the AKP government and the secularist establishment. The
closure case against the AKP in March 2008 on the grounds of being a ‘focal point
of anti-secular activity’ brought secularism once again to the main stage of Turkish
politics. The judicial process highlighted deep social divisions within Turkey, as
well as the urgency of a liberal reconfiguration of the country’s political system.
While the AKPwas spared closure, the July 2008 decision confirmed the allegations
of the Chief Prosecutor about its ‘anti-secular activities’. It is plausible to argue that a
redefinition of state–religion relations in Turkey, so that Muslims, non-Muslims,
atheists and agnostics enjoy equal respect for their beliefs is a necessary condition
of the AKP-advocated liberal version of secularism. The implementation of such a
reform could prove the sincerity of AKP commitments and reduce social cleavages,
sharply manifested since April 2007. What is clearly missing, however, is a high
level of mutual trust between Turkey’s conservatives and secularists. In a country
where a liberal culture of mutual toleration and respect for individual autonomy is
not fully-fledged and social trust is a scarce resource, an external actor such as the
European Union seems to be the actor best suited to act as arbiter and facilitate
trust-building. The reinvigoration of Turkey’s European integration process could
perhaps provide the best framework for the development of mutual respect for
different lifestyles within a tolerant society.
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29. Çağaptay, ‘The November 2002 Elections and Turkey’s New Political Era’, 44.
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Accession Process and the Question of Secularism]. Südosteuropa Mitteilungen 47, no.
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